TY - JOUR AU - Clemens, Jeffrey AU - Ippolito, Benedic TI - Implications of Medicaid Financing Reform for State Government Budgets JF - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series VL - No. 23965 PY - 2017 Y2 - October 2017 DO - 10.3386/w23965 UR - http://www.nber.org/papers/w23965 L1 - http://www.nber.org/papers/w23965.pdf N1 - Author contact info: Jeffrey Clemens Department of Economics University of California, San Diego 9500 Gilman Drive #0508 La Jolla, CA 92093 Tel: 858/534-5713 E-Mail: jeffclemens@ucsd.edu Benedic N. Ippolito American Enterprise Institute 1789 Massachusetts Avenue Washington, DC 20036 E-Mail: benedic.ippolito@aei.org M1 - published as Jeffrey Clemens, Benedic Ippolito. "Implications of Medicaid Financing Reform for State Government Budgets," in Robert A. Moffitt, editor, "Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 32" University of Chicago Press (2018) M3 - presented at "Tax Policy and the Economy", September 14, 2017 AB - We analyze potential reforms to Medicaid financing through the lens of fiscal federalism. Because substantial dollars are at stake, both the economic and political sides of intergovernmental transfers have high relevance in this setting. We show that changes in Medicaid financing formulas can shift amounts exceeding several hundred dollars per capita from "winning" states to "losing" states. In some cases, these amounts exceed 10 percent of states' own-source revenues. States' balanced budget requirements imply that such changes would, if not phased in gradually, require significant budgetary adjustment over short time horizons. We next show that alternative Medicaid financing structures have significant implications for states' exposure to budgetary stress during recessions. During the Great Recession, an acyclical block grant structure would have increased states' shortfalls by 2--3.5 percent of own-source revenues relative to either an explicitly countercyclical block grant or the current matching system. Finally, we assess the implications of several financing structures for the extent to which they subsidize states' decisions on both the "extensive" and "intensive" margins of coverage generosity over the short and long term. ER -