TY - JOUR AU - Ikeda,, Naoshi AU - Inoue, Kotaro AU - Watanabe, Sho TI - Enjoying the Quiet Life: Corporate Decision-Making by Entrenched Managers JF - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series VL - No. 23804 PY - 2017 Y2 - September 2017 DO - 10.3386/w23804 UR - http://www.nber.org/papers/w23804 L1 - http://www.nber.org/papers/w23804.pdf N1 - Author contact info: Naoshi Ikeda Tokyo Institute of Technology 2-12-1, W9-49, Ookayama, Tokyo, 152-8552 Japan E-Mail: ikeda.n.ab@m.titech.ac.jp Kotaro Inoue Tokyo Institute of Technology 2-12-1, W9-49, Ookayama Tokyo, 152-8552 Japan E-Mail: inoue.k.aq@m.titech.ac.jp Sho Watanabe Tokyo Institute of Technology 2-12-1, W9-49, Ookayama Tokyo, 152-8552 Japan E-Mail: satlusw1@gmail.com M1 - published as Naoshi Ikeda, Kotaro Inoue, Sho Watanabe. "Enjoying the Quiet Life: Corporate Decision-making by Entrenched Managers," in Franklin Allen, Shin-ichi Fukuda, Takeo Hoshi, organizers, "Corporate Governance (NBER-TCER-CEPR Conference)" Elsevier, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, volume 47 (2018) M3 - presented at "26th NBER-TCER-CEPR ", June 22, 2017 AB - In this study, we empirically test “quiet life hypothesis,” which predicts that managers who are subject to weak monitoring from the shareholders avoid making difficult decisions such as risky investment and business restructuring with Japanese firm data. We employ cross-shareholder and stable shareholder ownership as the proxy variables of the strength of a manager’s defense against market disciplinary power. We examine the effect of the proxy variables on manager-enacted corporate behaviors and the results indicate that entrenched managers who are insulated from disciplinary power of stock market avoid making difficult decisions such as large investments and business restructures. However, when managers are closely monitored by institutional investors and independent directors, they tend to be active in making difficult decisions. Taken together, our results are consistent with managerial quiet life hypothesis. ER -