TY - JOUR AU - Behaghel, Luc AU - Blanchet, Didier AU - Roger, Muriel TI - Retirement, Early Retirement and Disability: Explaining Labor Force Participation after 55 in France JF - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series VL - No. 20030 PY - 2014 Y2 - April 2014 DO - 10.3386/w20030 UR - http://www.nber.org/papers/w20030 L1 - http://www.nber.org/papers/w20030.pdf N1 - Author contact info: Luc Behaghel Paris School of Economics - Inra 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 PARIS FRANCE E-Mail: luc.behaghel@ens.fr Didier Blanchet INSEE 88 Avenue Verdier 92541 MONTROUGE CEDEX FRANCE E-Mail: didier.blanchet@insee.fr Muriel Roger CES - Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne 106-112 boulevard de l'Hôpital 75013 Paris France Tel: 33 1 44 07 81 36 E-Mail: Muriel.Roger@univ-paris1.fr M1 - published as Luc Behaghel, Didier Blanchet, Muriel Roger. "Retirement, Early Retirement, and Disability: Explaining Labor Force Participation after Fifty-Five in France," in David A. Wise, editor, "Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the World: Disability Insurance Programs and Retirement" University of Chicago Press (2016) M3 - presented at "International Social Security", September 26-28, 2013 AB - We analyze the influence of health and financial incentives on the retirement behavior of older workers in France, building upon Stock and Wise (1990) option value approach. The model accounts for three main retirement routes: the normal retirement, disability insurance (DI) and unemployment/preretirement pathways, and is estimated with a combination of microeconomic datasets that include the French data of the European SHARE survey. The estimates confirm that a decrease in the generosity of the pension and DI schemes induces people to stay longer in the labor market, and that people with better health tend to retire later. We present extreme situations simulating what individual's retirement behavior would have been if only one retirement route had existed and in the absence of constraints on work capabilities. We show that average years of work between 55 and 64 are nearly 14% greater when regular retirement incentives are applied to the whole population than when it is DI rules that are systematically applied. ER -