TY  - JOUR
AU  - Johnson, Erin M
AU  - Rehavi, M. Marit
TI  - Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 19242
PY  - 2013
Y2  - July 2013
DO  - 10.3386/w19242
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w19242
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w19242.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Erin M. Johnson
Wellesley Centers for Women
Wellesley College
106 Central Street
Wellesley, MA 02481-8203
E-Mail: ejohns17@wellesley.edu

Marit Rehavi
University of British Columbia
997-1873 East Mall
Vancouver, BC  V6T 1Z1
E-Mail: marit.rehavi@ubc.ca
AB  - This paper provides new evidence on the interaction between patient information and financial incentives in physician induced demand (PID).  Using rich microdata on childbirth, we compare the treatment of physicians when they are patients with that of comparable non-physicians.  We exploit a unique institutional feature of California to determine how inducement varies with obstetricians' financial incentives.  Consistent with PID, physicians are almost 10 percent less likely to receive a C-section, with only a quarter of this effect attributable to differential sorting of patients to hospitals or obstetricians.  Financial incentives have a large effect on C-section probabilities for non-physicians, but physician-patients are relatively unaffected.  Physicians also have better health outcomes, suggesting overuse of C-sections adversely impacts patient health.
ER  -