TY  - JOUR
AU  - Ganglmair, Bernhard
AU  - Tarantino, Emanuele
TI  - Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 17999
PY  - 2012
Y2  - April 2012
DO  - 10.3386/w17999
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w17999
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w17999.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Bernhard Ganglmair
ZEW Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
L7, 1, 68161
Mannheim, Germany
E-Mail: b.ganglmair@gmail.com

Emanuele Tarantino
LUISS and EIEF
Viale Romania 32
Roma, Italy
E-Mail: etarantino@gmail.com
M1  - published as Bernhard Ganglmair, Emanuele Tarantino. "Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting," in Timothy Simcoe, Ajay K. Agrawal, and Stuart Graham, organizers, "Standards, Patents and Innovations" International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 36 (2014)

M3  - presented at "Patents, Standards and Innovation Conference", January 20-21, 2012
AB  - In a model of industry standard setting with private information about firms' intellectual property, we analyze (a) firms' incentives to contribute to the development and improvement of a standard, and (b) firms' decision to disclose the existence of relevant intellectual property to other participants of the standard-setting process. If participants can disclose after the end of the process and fully exploit their bargaining leverage, then patent holders aspire to disclose always after the end of the process. However, if a patent holder cannot rely on the other participants to always contribute to the process, then it may be inclined to disclose before the end of the process. We also analyze under which conditions firms enter cross-licensing agreements that eliminate the strategic aspect of patent disclosure, and show that, in an institutional setting that implies a waiver of intellectual property rights if patents are not disclosed timely, firms aspire to disclose before the end of the process. Finally, we study the effect of product-market competition on patent disclosure.
ER  -