TY  - JOUR
AU  - Gans, Joshua
AU  - Murray, Fiona E
TI  - Funding Scientific Knowledge: Selection, Disclosure and the Public-Private Portfolio
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 16980
PY  - 2011
Y2  - April 2011
DO  - 10.3386/w16980
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w16980
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w16980.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Joshua S. Gans
Rotman School of Management
University of Toronto
105 St. George Street
Toronto ON M5S 3E6
CANADA
Tel: 416/978-3243
E-Mail: joshua.gans@rotman.utoronto.ca

Fiona Murray
MIT Sloan School of Management
100 Main Street, E62-470
Cambridge, MA 02142
Tel: 617/253-3681
Fax: 617/253-2660
E-Mail: fmurray@mit.edu
M1  - published as Joshua S. Gans, Fiona Murray. "Funding Scientific Knowledge: Selection, Disclosure and the Public-Private Portfolio," in Josh Lerner and Scott Stern, editors, "The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity Revisited" University of Chicago Press (2012)

M3  - presented at "Rate & Direction of Inventive Activity Conference", September 30 - October 2, 2010
AB  - This paper examines argues that while two distinct perspectives characterize the foundations of the public funding of research - filling a selection gap and solving a disclosure problem - in fact both the selection choices of public funders and their criteria for disclosure and commercialization shape the level and type of funding for research and the disclosures that arise as a consequence.  In making our argument, we begin by reviewing project selection criteria and policies towards disclosure and commercialization (including patent rights) made by major funding organizations, noting the great variation between these institutions. We then provide a model of how selection criteria and funding conditions imposed by funders interact with the preferences of scientists to shape those projects that accept public funds and the overall level of openness in research. Our analysis reveals complex and unexpected relationships between public funding, private funding, and public disclosure of research. We show, for example, that funding choices made by public agencies can lead to unintended, paradoxical effects, providing short-term openness while stifling longer-term innovation. Implications for empirical evaluation and an agenda for future research are discussed.
ER  -