TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cook, Philip J
AU  - MacDonald, John
TI  - Public Safety through Private Action: An economic assessment of BIDs, locks, and citizen cooperation
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 15877
PY  - 2010
Y2  - April 2010
DO  - 10.3386/w15877
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w15877
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w15877.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Philip J. Cook
Professor Emeritus of Economics
Sanford School of Public Policy
Duke University
PO Box 90312
Durham, NC 27708
Tel: 919 613 7360
Fax:  919/681-8288
E-Mail: pcook@duke.edu

John MacDonald
Department of Criminology
University of Pennsylvania
483 McNeil Building
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6286
E-Mail: johnmm@sas.upenn.edu
M1  - published as Philip J. Cook, John MacDonald. "The Role of Private Action in Controlling Crime," in Philip Cook, Jens Ludwig, Justin McCrary, editors, "Controlling Crime: Strategies and Tradeoffs" University of Chicago Press (2011)

M3  - presented at "Economical Crime Control Conference", January 15-16, 2010
AB  - Given the central role of private individuals and firms in determining the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, and the quality and availability of criminal opportunities, private actions arguably deserve a central role in the analysis of crime and crime prevention policy. But the leading scholarly commentaries on the crime drop during the 1990s have largely ignored the role of the private sector, as have policymakers.   Among the potentially relevant trends: growing reporting rates (documented in this paper); the growing sophistication and use of alarms, monitoring equipment and locks; the considerable increase in the employment of private security guards; and the decline in the use of cash.  Private actions of this sort have the potential to both reduce crime rates and reduce arrests and imprisonment.   Well-designed regulations and programs can encourage effective private action.

One creative method to harness private action to cost-effective crime control is the creation of business improvement districts (BIDs).  Our quasi-experimental analysis of Los Angeles BIDs demonstrates that the social benefits of BID expenditures on security are a large multiple (about 20)  of the private expenditures.  Creation and operation of effective BIDs requires a legal infrastructure that helps neighborhoods solve the collective action problem.
ER  -