TY - JOUR AU - Albanesi, Stefania TI - Optimal Taxation of Entrepreneurial Capital with Private Information JF - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series VL - No. 12419 PY - 2006 Y2 - August 2006 DO - 10.3386/w12419 UR - http://www.nber.org/papers/w12419 L1 - http://www.nber.org/papers/w12419.pdf N1 - Author contact info: Stefania Albanesi Department of Economics University of Pittsburgh 4901 Wesley W. Posvar Hall Pittsburgh, PA 15260 E-Mail: stefania.albanesi@gmail.com M1 - published as Stefania Albanesi. "Optimal Taxation of Entrepreneurial Capital with Private Information," in Michael Devereux and Roger Gordon, organizers, "Business Taxation (Trans-Atlantic Public Economics Seminar)" American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Volume 6, no. 2 (2014) M3 - presented at "SI 2005 EFG Working Group (EFCE)", July 18-22, 2005 AB - This paper studies optimal taxation of entrepreneurial capital with private information and multiple assets. Entrepreneurial activity is subject to a dynamic moral hazard problem and entrepreneurs face idiosyncratic capital risk. We first characterize the optimal allocation subject to the incentive compatibility constraints resulting from the private information. The optimal tax system implements such an allocation as a competitive equilibrium for a given market structure. We consider several market structures that differ in the assets or contracts traded and obtain three novel results. First, differential asset taxation is optimal. Marginal taxes on bonds depend on the correlation of their returns with idiosyncratic capital risk, which determines their hedging value. Entrepreneurial capital always receives a subsidy relative to other assets in the bad states. Second, if entrepreneurs are allowed to sell equity, the optimal tax system embeds a prescription for double taxation of capital income â€" at the firm level and at the investor level. Finally, we show that taxation of assets is essential even with competitive insurance contracts, when entrepreneurial portfolios are also unobserved. ER -