TY - JOUR AU - Canzoneri, Matthew B AU - Cumby, Robert E AU - Diba, Behzad T TI - How Do Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interact in the European Monetary Union? JF - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series VL - No. 11055 PY - 2005 Y2 - January 2005 DO - 10.3386/w11055 UR - http://www.nber.org/papers/w11055 L1 - http://www.nber.org/papers/w11055.pdf N1 - Author contact info: Matthew Canzoneri Department of Economics Georgetown University Washington, DC 20057 Tel: 202-687-5911 E-Mail: canzonem@georgetown.edu Robert E. Cumby Georgetown University School of Foreign Service Washington, DC 20057-1045 Tel: 202/687-2990 Fax: 202/687-6102 E-Mail: cumbyr@georgetown.edu Behzad Diba Department of Economics Georgetown University Washington, DC 20057 Tel: 202-687-5682 Fax: 202-687-6102 E-Mail: dibab@georgetown.edu M1 - published as Matthew B. Canzoneri, Robert E. Cumby, Behzad T. Diba. "How Do Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interact in the European Monetary Union?," in Richard H. Clarida, Jeffrey Frankel, Francesco Giavazzi and Kenneth D. West, editors, "NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2004" The MIT Press (2006) AB - Formation of the Euro area raises new questions about the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy. Using a New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) model, we show that a common monetary policy, responding to area-wide aggregates, has asymmetric effects on countries within the union, depending on whether they are large or small, or whether they have high or low debts. We analyze the implications of these asymmetries for the various countries welfare and for their fiscal policies. We also study rules for setting national tax and spending rates, rules that constrain movements in the deficit to GDP ratio. We ask whether these rules are necessary for the common monetary policy to be able to harmonize national inflation rates, and we analyze their effects on national welfare. We also discuss some potential failings of our model (and perhaps NNS models generally); in particular, our model's variance decompositions suggest that productivity shocks may play an inordinately large role, while fiscal shocks (or demand shocks generally) may play too small a role (even when 'rule of thumb' spenders are added). ER -