NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
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Detecting Medicare Abuse

David Becker, Daniel Kessler, Mark McClellan

NBER Working Paper No. 10677
Issued in August 2004
NBER Program(s):Health Economics

This paper identifies which types of patients and hospitals have abusive Medicare billings that are responsive to law enforcement. For a 20 percent random sample of elderly Medicare beneficiaries hospitalized from 1994-98 with one or more of six illnesses that are prone to abuse, we obtain longitudinal claims data linked with Social Security death records, hospital characteristics, and state/year-level anti-fraud enforcement efforts. We show that increased enforcement leads certain types of types of patients and hospitals to have lower billings, without adverse consequences for patients' health outcomes.

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A non-technical summary of this paper is available in the NBER Bulletin on Aging and Health. You can sign up to receive the NBER Bulletin on Aging and Health by email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w10677

Published: Becker, David, Daniel Kessler and Mark McClellan. "Detecting Medicare Abuse," Journal of Health Economics, 2005, v24(1,Jan), 189-210.

 
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